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As regional trading arrangements (RTAs) have spread, enlarged and deepened over the last
decade, they have posed challenges to economists on both intellectual and policy levels. On the
former, do RTAs stimulate growth and investment, facilitate technology transfer, shift comparative
advantage towards high value-added activities, provide credibility to reform programs, or induce
political stability and cooperation? Or do they, on the other hand, divert trade in inefficient
directions and undermine the multilateral trading system?
The answer is probably "all of these things, in different proportions according to the
particular circumstances of each RTA."  This then poses the policy challenge of how best to
manage RTAs in order to get the best balance of benefits and costs. For example, should technical
standards be harmonized and, if so, how; do direct or indirect taxes need to be equalized; how
should RTAs manage their international trade policies in an outward-looking  fashion?
Addressing these issues is one important focus of the research program of the International
Trade Division of the World Bank. It has produced a number of methodological innovations in the
traditional area of trade effects of RTAs and tackled four new areas of research: the dynamics of
regionalism (e.g., convergence, growth, investment, industrial location and migration), deep
integration (standards, tax harmonization), regionalism and the rest of the world (including its
effects on the multilateral trading system), and certain political economy dimensions of regionalism
(e.g., credibility and the use of RTAs as tools of diplomacy).
In addition to thematic work, the program includes a number of studies of specific regional
arrangements, conducted in collaboration with the Regional Vice Presidencies of the Bank.  Several
EU-Mediterranean Association Agreements have been studied and a joint program with the staff of
the Latin American and Caribbean Region entitled "Making  the Most of Mercosur"  is under way.
Future work is planned on African and Asian regional integration schemes.
Regionalism and Development findings have been and will, in future, be released in a
number of outlets. Recent World Bank Policy Research Working Papers concerning these issues
include:
Glenn Harrison, Tom Rutherford and David Tarr, "Economic Implications for Turkey
of a Customs Union with the European Union," (WPS 1599, May 1996).
Maurice Schiff, "Small is Beautiful, Preferential Trade Agreements and the Impact of
Country Size, Market Share, Efficiency and Trade Policy," (WPS 1668, October 1996).
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Application to Chile" (WPS 1751, April 1997)
Magnus Blomstrom and Ari Kokko, "Regional Integration  and Foreign Direct
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Glenn Harrison, Thomas Rutherford and David Tarr, "Trade Policy Options for Chile:
A Quantitative Evaluation" (forthcoming)
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Dimension?"
Sherry Stephenson, "Standards, Conformity Assessments and Developing Countries"
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Other papers on regionalism produced by IECIT include:
Ahmed Galal and Bernard Hoekman (eds), Regional Partners in Global Markets: Limits
and Possibilities of the Euro-Med Initiative. CEPR 1997.
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Reorientation of East European Trade," World Bank Economic Review (forthcoming)
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Claudio Frischtak, Danny M. Leipziger and John F. Normand, "Industrial Policy in
Mercosur: Issues and Lessons"
Sam Laird (WTO), "Mercosur Trade Policy: Towards Greater Integration"
Margaret Miller and Jerry Caprio, "Empirical Evidence on the Role of Credit for SME
Exports in Mercosur"
Malcom Rowat, "Competition Policy within Mercosur"
For copies of these papers or information about these programs contact Maurice Schiff, The
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20433.
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International Economics Department1. Introduction
How  do  different  trading  arrangements  influence the  industrialisation  process  of
developing  countries? Can preferential  trading  arrangements  (PTAs)  be superior  to
multilateral  liberalisation,  or at least an alternative  when  multilateral  liberalisation
proceeds  slowly? If so, what  form should  the PTAS  take? Are developing  countries
better advised  to seek PTAs  with  developed countries or amongst  themselves?
Traditional  analysis of these issues has been based on the ideas of trade  creation
and trade  diversion. For example, consider a pair of less developed countries  (LDCS)
whose comparative  advantage  is such that each produces  agricultural  products  and
a different manufactured  good, and exports only agriculture, importing manufactures
from a developed  country.  Can a PTA between the  LDCs promote  industrialisation?
The answer  is yes -they  will trade  their  manufactures  instead  of importing  them
from the developed  country. This will lead to increased production of manufactures,
but  the  basis  of  this  is  trade  diversion.  As  such  it  may  be  welfare  reducing
-essentially  the PTA and consequent trade diversion act as a way of creating regional
import  substitution.
The  problem  with  this  analysis  is  that  it  starts  from  assuming  a  pattern  of
comparative  advantage.  The  initial  situation  is  one  in  which  the  LDCs import
manufactures  only because the developed country is assumed to have a comparative
advantage  in  manufactures,  and  given  this  assumption,  the  conclusion  that  PTAs
promote industrialisation  in the LDCs  by working against their comparative advantage
is  hardly  surprising.  The  assumption  certainly  stands  in  sharp  contrast  to  the
apparently  changing  comparative advantage  of newly industrialised  countries.  The
experience of these countries suggests the need for an analysis in which the pattern
of comparative  advantage  is not set in stone but is potentially flexible, and in which
LDCs  can  develop  and  converge  -in  both  income  and  economic  structure-  to
developed  economies.
How can the  analysis be extended  to allow for the dramatic  changes  in relative
income and  in industrial  structure  that we have seen in some developing countries?
One  way  is  to  build  a  model  of  trade  and  growth,  and  then  see  how  trading
arrangements  change the incentives for factor accumulation  and  countries'  rates  of
Igrowth  and  relative  factor endowments.  While  there  is a  small  literature  on  the
growth  effects of PTAs  (see Baldwin and Venables, 1995, for a survey), papers in this
area  do  not  yet  have  sufficient  micro-foundations  to  be  able  to  convincingly
discriminate  between different types of trading  arrangement.
An alternative  direction is to suppose  that there are few fundamental  differences
between  countries  which  generate  immutable  patterns  of  comparative  advantage.
Instead  the  pattern  of  trade  and  development  we see  in  the  world  economy  is
determined  mainly  by history. Cumulative  causation  has created concentrations  of
industrial  activity  in particular  locations  (developed countries)  and  left other areas
more dependent  on primary activities. Economic development  can be thought  of as
the  spread  of  these  concentrations  from  country  to  country.  Different  trading
arrangements  may have a major impact on this development process. By changing the
attractiveness of countries as a base for manufacturing production they can potentially
trigger -or  postpone-  industrial  development.
In this paper we develop this approach, and illustrate how trading  arrangements
can shape economic development. The building blocks for our approach  are familiar
from new trade theory, and from somewhat older development economics. As in new
trade  theory  we  focus on  the  location  decisions of firms  with  increasing  returns
technologies operating  in imperfectly competitive environments.  From development
economics  we  take  the  ideas  of  forward  and  backward  linkages  between  firms.
Combining these linkages with  imperfect competition creates pecuniary externalities
between firms, and  it is this that provides the mechanism for cumulative  causation.
The pecuniary externalities support  existing agglomerations of industrial  activity, and
also provide  a mechanism for the  'take-off' of newly industrialising  economies.
Throughout  the  paper  we  shall  concentrate  exclusively  on  the  trade  flows
generated  by  these  agglomeration  forces,  and  assume  that  countries  have  no
underlying  differences  in  technology  or  relative  factor endowments  that  generate
traditional comparative advantage. This is clearly an extreme position, and one which
neglects some of the implications of trade liberalization. Nevertheless, we think that
the  forces  we  illuminate  provide  significant  insights  into  the  effects of  trade  on
economic development.
2The paper  is organised  as follows. In the next section we provide  an overview of
the analytical framework  that we shall use throughout  the paper, which is presented
in more detail  in the appendix.  In section 3 we run through a series of experiments,
simulating  the  effects of  different  trading  arrangements  on  the  industrialisation
process,  and  showing  how  alternative  arrangements  can  lead  to  quite  different
patterns of development. It also turns out that trade liberalisation may have dissimilar
impacts  on similar  member  economies, creating  internal  tensions within  a PTA. In
section  4 we  draw  out  the  policy  implications  of our  findings,  discussing  some
evidence  of the  empirical  relevance of the forces captured  by  this framework,  and
relating  our  results  to  the  recent  experiences  of  different  LDCs.  A  final  section
summarises  the main conclusions.
2. An  analytical  framework
Details of our model are given in the appendix,  and  here we only give an informal
overview of the its key features.
We shall  assume that  each  country  has -or  may  have-  two  sectors. One  is a
perfectly competitive commodity sector which, in line with most of the literature, we
shall call agriculture.  It produces  its output  using a sector specific factor (land) and
a sectorally mobile factor (labour). For simplicity we assume that this product is freely
traded."I  We  focus  the  analysis  on  the  other  sector,  industry,  although  the  two
sectors  interact  in general  equilibrium. As industry  relocates, so agriculture  adjusts
to release or absorb labour and to maintain payments balance; land use in agriculture
means  that  the  wage  in  a  country  will  be  higher  the  smaller  is  that  country's
agricultural  employment.
The industrial  sector takes the form of a monopolistically competitive industry  in
which  firms  produce  differentiated  products.  This  is  modelled  as  'Dixit-Stiglitz'
monopolistic competition, in the form applied to international economics by Helpman
'  A  more realistic modelling of the agricultural  sector, with positive trade  costs and  different
crops, would not alter the main results of the paper but would  shift the focus away from our main
concern here, which is the effects of trade  policy on industrialisation.
3and  Krugman  (1985) and  others.  We generalise  this model to include  intermediate
goods,  along  the  lines of  Krugman  and  Venables  (1995) and  Puga  and  Venables
(forthcoming a, forthcoming b). That is, each firm's output is used both as a final good
and as an intermediate  good, and each firm uses as inputs both labour and the output
of other  firms. The presence of Intermediate goods, when combined with  Imperfect
competition, generates  the forward  and backwards  linkages which are central to our
approach.  Rather than  working with  a full input-output  structure  (as in Puga  and
Venables, forthcoming  b) we work with  a single aggregate sector that uses its own
output  as input.
Firms enter  and  exit in response  to  profit opportunities,  giving a long  run  zero
profit equilibrium.  It is this that  determines  the level of industrial  activity  in each
country  and  to  understand  it,  it  is  helpful  to  think  of  there  being  four  forces
determining  the profitability of firms in a particular country. The first is factor market
competition.  A  country  that  has  a  lot  of  industry  will  have  higher  wages,  this
reducing  firms' profitability. The second is product  market competition. Given some
trade barriers a country with more industry will, other things being equal, have lower
output prices, this also reducing profitability. These are standard  'neoclassical' forces,
working  for the dispersion of activity -encouraging  firms to locate where  labour is
cheap and  where there is little supply from other firms.
Working  in  the  other  direction  are  cost  (forward)  and  demand  (backwards)
linkages. Cost linkages come from the fact that having more firms in a location means
that more  intermediate  inputs  are locally available, this reducing  costs and  raising
profits. Demand linkages arise as having more firms in a location creates intermediate
demands, this raising the sales and profitability of other firms. Both these forces mean
that firms want to set up in the same country as existing firms -they  are therefore
'centripetal'  forces, working towards the concentration of industry in a single location.
It is tension between these four forces that determines  the equilibrium  pattern  of
location. If the first two are more powerful than the last two then it will generally be
the case that industry  operates  in all locations and we are then in a standard  'new
trade  theory'  world. This means that there is no dichotomy between developed  and
less developed  countries  -if  we assume  that countries  all have  the  same relative
4endowments,  technologies, and preferences, then they will all have similar industrial
structures  and patterns  of trade.121
But  if the  last  two  forces are  powerful  enough  compared  to  the  first two,  then
equilibrium  will involve  agglomeration  of manufacturing  in  a subset  of countries.
Without  assuming  differences in underlying  comparative  advantage  the world  will
nevertheless  be organised  into some countries  with  industry,  and  other  countries
without.  The countries with  industry will be richer, for two reasons; the demand  for
labour in  industry  raises wages,  and  the local supply  of manufactures  reduces  the
consumer  price  index.  They  will  also  have  a  larger  market,  arising  both  from
consumer  and  intermediate  demands.  And  they  will  have  a  better  supply  of
intermediate  goods,  showing  up  as  a lower  price  index  for these  goods.  At  this
equilibrium  there  may  be quite  large  differences  in  wages  and  unit  labour  costs
between  the  developed  and  less  developed  countries,  but  despite  this  it  is  not
profitable for a firm to relocate to an LDC. If a firm were to do so it would  benefit
from lower wages, and from being the only local supplier  in this market  (our factor
market  and product  market competition  effects). But it would  forego the benefits of
proximity  to its suppliers  and  its industrial  customers  (the forward  and  backward
linkages).
How does trade liberalisation affect this? There are three main mechanisms. First,
if the barriers  incurred in exporting from an LDC are reduced, then this reduces one
of the disadvantages  of being in an LDC; it will now be cheaper to export from the
LDC to  the  large  developed  country  market.  This  means  that  we  expect  to  see
reductions in developed country import barriers facilitating the spread  of industry  to
LDCs.  What  about  LDC import  barriers? There are two mechanisms here, pulling  in
opposite  directions. First, opening  markets to increased  product  market competition
from foreign firms reduces the potential profitability of local firms. But second, lower
import barriers mean that intermediate goods can be imported  more cheaply, and this
will raise potential  profitability. Combining these mechanisms we shall often see an
2  Although there may be net trade arising from market size differences  alone, see for example
Krugman (1980).
5effect which is, in some sense, greater than the sum of the parts. Cumulative causation
can be triggered,  leading to quite large changes in levels of industrial  activity.' 3 I
Different PTAS  offer a variety of combinations of reductions in trade barriers, which
affect differently  countries  with different amounts  of established  industry,  different
wage rates,  and  markets  of different  sizes. In the  next section we look at how the
balance between market access, import competition, wage differentials, and linkages
is affected by different PTAS.  We study whether trade policy can make industry  spread
to  LDCs, and if so what  trading  arrangements  are most conducive to this spread.
3. Trading  arrangements
Throughout  this section we shall work with four countries, all of which are assumed
to  be the  same size (i.e. have the same factor endowments).  We assume values  for
parameters  such  that  there  is  an  initial  equilibrium  in  which  manufacturing  is
concentrated  in just  two of the countries. Within  the formal structure  of the model
which two countries  is indeterminate.  We simply label the  two countries  that have
industry  North, and  the two that do not, South.' 1]
We set the following structure of trade barriers between economies. All trade flows
in manufactures  have an equal level of real trade costs per unit, which can be thought
of a set of costs incurred when doing business at a distance. In addition,  there are ad
valorem  tariffs. In the initial equilibrium we assume that these are zero between the
two  Northern  economies, and  positive and  equal on all other  manufactured  trade
flows. The experiments we report  in this section are reductions in some or all of the
tariff  barriers,  corresponding  to  different  trade  liberalisation  packages.  In  all  the
experiments  we  undertake  we  assume  that  the  two  Northern  economies  follow
3  We do not allow trade  liberalisation to change the technology in use, or to change the price
mark-ups  through  strategic interaction between firms.
4  We choose four countries because for the questions we want to address we need two Southern
economies, and there are some benefits from having a structure which allows for symmetry  between
regions.
6identical policies, and keep identical economic structures (the reason for this is simply
to focus on South). We shall consequently refer to North  as a single policy maker.
In  this  section  we  go  fairly  rapidly  through  a  set  of  experiments,  based  on
numerical  simulation,  and draw  out the way in which the spread  of industry  differs
between cases. In section 4 we have a fuller discussion of policy issues, and look In
greater detail at questions raised by the potentially unequal distribution of the benefits
between Southern  economies.
We shall  illustrate  outcomes  by presenting  a series of figures  with  the  level of
tariffs, denoted  T, on  the horizontal  axis (T = 1 is free trade,  T-  1 the  ad valorem
tariff  rate).  The  initial  value,  T, is  the  same  for  all  manufacturing  trade  flows
involving a Southern economy, and liberalisation will reduce some (or, in the case of
multilateral  liberalisation,  all)  of  these  tariffs,  with  those  not  affected  by  the
liberalisation  held  at  T. In each sub-section below  two figures  are  presented.  The
vertical axis in the a figure is the share of world industry  in each of the two Southern
economies  (the Northern  share obviously given by one minus  the sum  of Southern
shares), and we shall use these figures to demonstrate  the way in which liberalisation
causes industry  to relocate. The b figures give real wages inclusive of tariff revenue
(distributed  to workers  in a lump sum manner) for the two Southern countries  and
for North. These change because of changes in demand for labour, because of changes
in the  consumer  price indices in each country, and  because of changes  in levels of
tariff revenue. 1 5l
3.1. Multilateral  liberalisation
We take  as benchmark  case multilateral  trade  liberalisation  between  all  countries.
Figure la shows that with  the initial tariff barriers,  T = 1.15 (for all North-South  and
South-South  trade, while there  is free North-North  trade), the whole  of industry  is
agglomerated  in North -the  lines S, and  S 2 giving the share of each of the Southern
economies are at zero. At this equilibrium Southern real wages are approximately  65%
of Northern  (despite the fact that there are no differences in technology, labour skills
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8or relative endowments).  As global tariffs  T fall there comes a point,  (around  1.14),
at which  it becomes profitable for some firms to  relocate South. We  have already
outlined  the forces driving  this. Profitability of Southern  firms (potential,  if not yet
actual firms) is reduced by having a more open market. But it is increased by the fall
in  the  price  of  imported  intermediate  goods,  and  by  easier  access to  the  large
Northern  market.  These  last  two  forces  -combined  with  the  large  initial  wage
difference-  are bound to dominate, causing industry to move South. Notice however
that industry  initially only starts operating in one of the Southern countries. If the two
Southern  countries  are identical, the choice of which  is entirely a matter of chance
-we  shall label it S,. The reason for this uneven spread  is that the first firms to set
up  create cost and  demand  linkages to other firms in the same  country.  They also
raise wages, but the linkage effects are stronger, so what we see is a second industrial
agglomeration  forming  in just one of the LDCs. 161
The range of tariffs from around  1.14  to 1.10  is therefore one in which industry has
spread  to one Southern country, but not the other. As tariffs are reduced  below this
point it becomes profitable for manufacturing firms to become established in the other
LDC, S2. We see that this process is very abrupt, and partly at the expense of S,, which
suffers a small fall in its share of world industry.  At tariffs below this point the two
Southern  economies  are  identical,  and  further  reductions  in  T  bring  a  steady
relocation  of industry  to these economies. At completely free trade  each of the now
developed  Southern  countries  has 25% of world  industry  (equal to its share  of the
world  endowment).
The corresponding real wage picture is lb. Although welfare effects are not directly
caused by the evolution in country shares of industry they are closely related with it.
Countries with more industry  have higher labour demand and have to import fewer
varieties subject to trade  barriers, both effects supporting  the real income differences
in figure l b. This comes through clearly in the increase in Southern economies' wages.
Northern  real wages decline, although this result is not general. The combined effect
of changing labour demand and price indices on Northern  wages is ambiguous, with
the balance of decline and increase depending  quite sensitively on parameter  values.
6  There may be other mechanisms which reinforce this result -most  obviously a confidence factor
created by early entrants'  success.
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10There are two main messages from these figures. First, trade  liberalisation  breaks
down  existing agglomerations  of activity. As trade  costs are reduced  firms become
more footloose and more sensitive to international  differences in factor prices, and  it
is  this  that  drives  the  convergence  in  the  figures.  Second,  the  benefits  will  not
necessarily be equally divided  between the Southern  economies) 7' It follows directly
from  the  presence  of  agglomeration  forces  in  the  model  that  as  the  Northern
agglomeration  starts to break down,  so new agglomerations  may develop.
3.2. Unilateral
We now turn from multilateral to unilateral liberalisation. A single Southern economy
(S,) engages  in  unilateral  import  tariff  liberalisation,  with  all  other  barriers  held
constant (at value T = 1.15).  The solid lines in figures 2a and 2b tell the story, with the
dashed  lines on this and  all remaining  figures giving multilateral  liberalisation as a
reference case.
The  striking  point  to  note  about  the  figure  is  that  openness  to  imports  of
manufactures  causes manufacturing production to start. Import competition obviously
has a negative effect through  the product  market, and access to the Northern  market
is not liberalised. But the cheaper supply of imported intermediate  goods becomes the
dominant  force, enabling  industry  to become established. 81 Industry  will  develop
sooner and  at larger scale (i.e., the S, curve will be higher) the greater  is the share of
intermediates  in production,  and the larger is the market in the liberalising economy.
Furthermore, the unilateral reduction unambiguously  raises wages in the liberalising
country.' 9 1 Only  if all of the  Southern  economy's  trading  partners  had  sufficiently
high tariffs could its industrialisation  be prevented. But providing this is not the case,
we find that the combination of low wages and low cost intermediates  (due to import
7  The  extent  and  form  of  divergence  between  Southern  economies  depend  on  model
specifications. If a full input-output  structure is considered and not all sectors are tightly linked to each
other, each Southern  economy may get agglomerations of different sectors, although  there is always
a tendency for unequal  development  on the aggregate.
8  For fuller development  of this argument  in a somewhat different model see Venables (1996).
9  Before industrialisation takes off there is a slight real wage decrease in the liberalising economy
because  of falling tariff revenue, but  as soon as it starts to attract some industrial  production  real
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12liberalisation) are sufficient to lead to industrialisation.  The policy has no direct effect
on the other Southern economy (it has no industry to benefit from SI's liberalisation),
but it does experience a slight real wage increase -a  terms of trade improvement  due
to the increased  world supply  of manufactures.
Comparing  unilateral  with  multilateral,  the  continuing  barriers  to  LDC'S exports
means  both  that  it takes a lower tariff rate to start industrialisation  and  that, once
started, S, has a lower share of manufacturing than in the multilateral case. Associated
with  this, real wages are lower in S, than in the case of multilateral  liberalisation.
3.3. South-South  PTA
In a South-South PTA  the two Southern economies reduce trade barriers between each
other,  with  import  barriers  to  and  from  North  held  constant.  The  results  are
illustrated  in figures  3a and 3b.
Once  again,  the  trade  liberalisation  is  sufficient  to  cause  industry  to  become
established  in the LDCS,  but the mechanism is completely different from the previous
case of unilateral tariff reductions. In that case industry started in response to cheaper
intermediate  inputs  -a  force which cannot operate here as in the initial position  no
intermediates  are  affected  by the  tariff reduction.  Instead,  the driving  force is the
effective  market  enlargement  caused  by  reducing  intra-South  barriers.  Like  the
multilateral  case, the spread of industry to LDCS is uneven, initially developing in one
of the countries  and only at lower trade barriers spreading  to the second.
What  can  be said  by  way  of comparison  with  the  previous  cases? Looking  at
industrial  activity levels, both the Southern economies attract less industry  than with
multilateral,  as they  do  not benefit from better  access to Northern  markets  nor to
Northern-produced  intermediates.  Compared to unilateral liberalization we see that
with  the  South-South  arrangement  industry  is  attracted  later,  although  as  tariffs
become very small the gain is larger. Comparison of Southern real wage movements
is similar.
Although  the ranking  of South-South and  multilateral  is general, the ranking  of
South-South  with  unilateral  is  not.  As  we  have  pointed  out,  quite  different
mechanisms  trigger  industrialisation  in  the  two  cases.  With  South-South
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14demand.  With  unilateral,  it is triggered  by forward  linkages from imports,  and  its
timing  depends  on the strength  of these linkages. It is possible that if linkages  are
weak and Southern  demand  large then a South-South PTA may attract industry  at a
higher value of T than does a unilateral  liberalization.
3.4. Southern Open Regionalism
We know look at the effects of 'open regionalism', or unilateral  liberalisation by both
Southern  economies.  As  in  a  South-South  PTA bilateral  tariffs  between  the  two
Southern  economies are reduced,  but now imports from the Northern  economy are
liberalised as well. Figures 4a and 4b illustrate the results.
The evolution  of industry  is similar to that of a South-South PTA. Industrialisation
starts first in one Southern country, then in the other. The process of industrialisation
certainly starts sooner  (at higher levels of I) in one of the countries than is the case
with  unilateral  liberalisation; this is because the relationship with  North is the same,
and  in  addition  there  are  the  benefits of Southern  liberalisation.  Comparing  open
regionalism  with  a  South-South  PTA we  see in  the  example  illustrated  that  open
regionalism  leads  to  earlier  industrialisation.  However,  this  is  not  general
-liberalization  with North brings benefits from forward  linkages and disadvantages
from import  competition, the net effect of which is ambiguous.
At low levels of tariffs open regionalism gives a higher level of real income than
unilateral  liberalisation,  but  lower than  both  South-South  and  multilateral.  This is
because of the asymmetry  in North-South  trading arrangements. Southern exports to
North still face a tariff barrier, while Northern  imports to South are untaxed.
3.5. North-South  PTA
What if, instead of liberalising bilaterally with the other Southern economy, one of the
Southern  countries  forms  a PTA with  North?"I 0 Figures  5a and  5b summarise  the
results.
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16Bilateral  North-South  liberalisation  spreads  a  larger  share  of  industry  to  the
liberalising Southern  economy, and gives this economy higher real wages, than any
of the other arrangements  we have considered (compare it with  the multilateral  case
given  by  the  dashed  lines).  This  is  because  a  PTA with  North  gives  a  Southern
economy the benefits of both improved  access to the large Northern  market  and low
cost availability of Northern  intermediates. The liberalising Southern economy suffers
from more competition from Northern  firms but, because Southern wages are lower,
the balance of better reciprocal market access flips in favour of South. This spread  of
industry  comes at the expense of a large fall in Northern's  share of industry  (and also
a fall in  Northern  real wages).  The loser  (compared  to  other  arrangements)  is of
course the  other  Southern  economy which  does  not attract  any industry  and  only
experiences  a  slight  increase  in  real  wages  through  the  rise  in  world  industrial
production.
3.6. Hub-and-spoke
The previous experiment assumed that North formed a free trade area (FTA) with just
one  Southern  economy.  An  interesting  alternative  is that  in  which  North  forms  a
bilateral  FTA  with  each of the Southern  economies, but  these keep barriers  between
them  unchanged.  This kind  of trade  policy arrangement  turns  North  (that is, both
Northern  economies jointly)  into the 'hub' of this hub-and-spoke  arrangement.
Figures  6a and  6b represent  such  a case. It  brings  relatively  rapid  and  strong
industrialisation  to South, for the same reasons that applied in the case of a bilateral
North-South  FTA.  The effects now affect both the Southern economies (after the initial
phase of divergence between them). The spread  of industry  to South is however less
pronounced  than  under  multilateral  liberalisation  because  location  in  each  of the
Southern  economies is penalised by the barriers between the Southern economies. It
is this which enables North to maintain a higher real wage in this case than in either
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1  84. Policy issues
How  relevant  in  practice  are  the  forces captured  in  this framework?  How  much
evidence  is  there  to  support  the  argument  that  PTAS cause  such  changes  in  the
production  structure of nations? The only study of which we are aware that directly
addresses  these issues  is Hanson's  work  on  Mexico. Hanson  (1994), using  data  on
Mexico,  finds  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  agglomeration  is  associated  with
increasing returns. He also shows (Hanson, forthcoming) that integration with the us
has had  strong effects on industry  location in Mexico. Industry  has shifted towards
states  with  good  access to  the  us  market  (demand  linkages).  At  the  same  time,
employment  growth  has been higher in regions that have larger agglomerations  of
industries  with  buyer/supplier  relationships  (cost linkages).
While there  is support  for the relevance of this forces, we are not aware  of any
empirical work on their importance under specific trading arrangements. Nevertheless
we believe the experiments  of the previous  section can shed  some light on some of
the  trade  policy  choices  currently  faced  by  LDCs.  The remainder  of  this  section
discusses the  main implications.
4.1. Unilateral or concerted liberalisation
Recent years have seen  many LDCS  (in particular  East Asian economies) undertake
unilateral  trade  liberalisation. However, others  (including some of the partners  East
Asian countries have gathered with in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation process,
APEC) have  been  reluctant  to  lower  their  tariffs  without  receiving  reciprocal
concessions. What are the benefits of unilateral liberalisation, and can countries expect
to do better by concerted action?
The  answer  to  the  first  part  of  this  is, as  we  have  seen  (3.2), that  unilateral
liberalisation can attract industry and bring a real income gain. Although more intense
import competition  has an adverse effect on profitability in the liberalising economy,
import  supply  creates  beneficial  forward  linkages  to  domestic  production  and
promotes  industrialisation.  While in the model such linkages arise just  from the use
of these goods as inputs, in reality we might think of these linkages coming through
several channels. As a recent World Bank (1994)  study argues:
19'By opening  their economies, countries gain access to more affordable consumer
goods  and  to technologies and intermediate  goods that  help reduce production
costs. Thus, by improving  the climate for investment, liberalization also helps to
attract foreign capital. Foreign investment, in turn, can provide  the technology
and financing  required  to establish a more efficient production  structure.'
Tybout  and  Westbrook  (1994) find  that  trade  liberalisation in  Mexico has reduced
average  costs  in  most  industries.  In  more  export-oriented  industries  these  cost
reductions  were  due  mainly  to  the type  of forces captured  by  our  model  (falling
prices  of intermediates),  while  in sectors with  higher import  penetration  these  cost
effects appeared  to be combined  with  relative  productivity  improvements.  At  the
same  time  they find  that increased  import  penetration  has shifted  downwards  the
demand  for domestic  products.
In  our  analysis  we  find  that  the  balance between  import  competition  and  cost
linkages,  combined  with  low  initial wages,  tends  to  work  out  in  favour  of  the
liberalising economy, leading to industrialisation, as in figure 2. However, the benefits
of  unilateral  liberalisation  alone,  may  be  relatively  small;  in  our  examples  full
unilateral  liberalisation  gave a lower real income than any of the other experiments
considered.  What  can  LDCs  do  to  better  promote  industrialisation  through  trade
policy?
Our analysis suggests the strong likelihood of gains from concerted action, but two
reservations  have to be made. The first is that the gains from concerted action may
not be divided  equally between the members. Even in the case of open regionalism
-which  in  our  modelling  is  no  more  than  simultaneous  liberalisation  by  both
Southern economies-  there may be an interval in which one country does worse than
it would if it were the only country to liberalise. We return  to these issues of division
of  the  gains  in  section  4.4. The second  qualification  is  that,  even  though  all  our
simulations  give greater gains from concerted action than from unilateral, we have no
general theorems  -all  results  are sensitive to specification of the model and  of the
experiment. In particular, North-South and South-South PTAs  operate in quite different
ways,  and we now turn  to comparison of these two cases.
204.2. South-South  or North-South?
Should  countries with  highly developed industrial  systems be part of the concerted
liberalisation,  or  excluded  from  it?  We  address  this  by  comparing  South-South
arrangements  involving  North.
South-South  PTAs  work essentially by enlarging  market size, and  their success is
dependent  on  the  combined  market  size  being  large  enough  to  attract  industry.
Analysis indicates that the smaller are the Southern countries then the later and  less
is the industrialisation  (in terms of the figures we have presented,  the curves S, and
S2 are pushed  down and to the left). The mechanism is a form of trade diversion  but
-unlike  the traditional  analysis outlined in the introduction-  the diversion may be
successful  in  bringing  about  a 'critical mass'  of activity from which  a viable,  and
welfare improving, industrial  base is created. Evidently, the market size of the group
must reach a certain minimum size for this to work. The failure of many South-South
PTAS  can perhaps  be attributed  to inadequate scale. As Corden  (1993)  puts  it:
'It is far better for Argentina  to go for the world market  -i.e.,  to liberalise
unilaterally  and in a non-discriminatory  fashion, as she has been doing-  than
just  go for the Brazilian market. Brazil has the largest economy in the Third
World, and yet it is smaller than Canada's  (as measured  by the dollar value of
GDP). And this applies even more to Brazil.'
North-South  PTAs work quite  differently, on the basis of improved  access to the
large  Northern  market  and  improved  supply  of  intermediate  goods,  offset  by
increased  import  competition  in domestic  markets. In all cases we have  examined
North-South  arrangements  are, from the point of view of the participating  Southern
economies, better than South-South agreements. The reasons for the success of these
North-South  agreements  merits  some  thought.  In  many  new  trade  models  the
argument  is made that liberalisation between economies of different sizes will draw
industry  into the country with the large market  (the 'centre') and away from smaller
('peripheral')  countries.  However,  the  strength  of  these  forces  is  greatest  at
intermediate  levels of trade  barrier, and at very low barriers factor price differences
can overturn  these effects. How does this relate to our findings that liberalisation will
move industry  out of the large economy to the small? Centripetal forces are certainly
present in the model we have developed -indeed,  they are amplified by forward  and
backward  linkages. But these forces are precisely those that make for the North-South
21divide in the initial equilibrium -they  create the initial wage differentials. Given this
initial position, in particular  the wage differences, further  liberalisation  then moves
industry  out  of  the  large  and  developed  region,  to  the  less  developed.  The
circumstances  that  are  most  conducive  to  South  benefitting  from  a  North-South
agreement  of this type are, therefore, low remaining barriers to the Northern  market
(secured, for example, by proximity, as in NAFTA or the EU'S  Southern  regions and
prospective  Eastern regions), combined with low unit labour costs.
What about North? The flip side of Southern gains is that, in this framework, North
may lose. As the industrial  agglomeration in the Northern  economy breaks down, so
there may be a decline in Northern  real income. These losses are greatest for South-
South liberalisation.  Of the arrangements  where  North reduces  barriers to Southern
imports,  multilateral  liberalisation  causes  larger  losses  than  hub-and-spoke
arrangements.  This may be one of the reasons that has induced the European  Union
to choose a bilateral rather than multilateral approach  to trade liberalisation with  its
neighbours.  The set of bilateral association agreements that the European  Union has
established  both  in Central and  Eastern  Europe and  in  the Mediterranean  have  in
effect turned  it into the hub of a large web of trading  arrangements.
Does  this  imply  that North  would  be better  off by  not reducing  its barriers  to
Southern  imports? Not necessarily. In fact, our analysis suggests  three reasons why
not liberalising may be a worse option.
First, Northern  losses in this context are not general. All our experiments start from
an equilibrium  in which South has no industry,  so Northern  has no manufacturing
imports  and  there  are  large  differences  in  unit  labour  costs. With  higher  initial
development  levels in South and smaller initial differences in unit labour costs, real
wages  in  North  tend  to  rise  instead  (see  Krugman  and  Venables,  1995, for  an
elaboration  of this point) Jl
Second, even if North were to lose from opening its market to Southern  imports,
it  would  lose  more  from  remaining  closed while  Southern  economies  liberalise
amongst themselves. Comparison of South-South vs. multilateral liberalisation shows
that in  either  case industry  spreads  to  Southern  countries,  but  under  South-South
"  Recall  also that we have  excluded  any gains from  trade through comparative  advantage,  which
in practice  are likely to bring further benefits  to Northern consumers.
22liberalisation  Northern  firms  and  consumers  have  to  pay  higher  prices  on  the
increasing number  of goods  produced  in South, so real wages are lower.
Third,  falling  real wage  differences between  North  and  South may  help reduce
migration  pressures.  One of the main arguments  in favour  of NAFTA in the United
States  was  reducing  illegal  migration  from  Mexico  (and,  in  fact,  Hanson  and
Spilinbergo,  1996, show  that  illegal  migration  from  Mexico  to  the  us  is  very
responsive  to changes  in relative wages).
4.3. Open regionalism  vs. Southern trading blocs
The APEC  process  has raised  hopes that  integration  in the Asia-Pacific region may
develop  in a less inward-looking way than in other geographical  areas, and perhaps
even catalyse deeper  global trade  liberalisation. Calls for the formation of a regional
trading  bloc in  Asia have received little support.  The amount  of trade  covered  by
ASEAN,  the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,  remains small. The East Asian
Economic Group  (EAEG)  has so far lacked the necessary backing to take off. Instead,
inward-looking  regional  integration  is  giving  way  to  APEC's vision  of  'open
regionalism'.
In the report  presented  at APEC's  1994 annual summit  in Bogor, the APEC  Eminent
Persons  Group explained  APEC's  vision of open  regionalism as follows. First, APEC
members  should  liberalise  intra-APEC  trade  flows  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis.
Second, APEC  should, as a group, treat nonmembers as it does members, provided that
nonmembers make reciprocal offers. Third, any individual  APEC  member should  have
the  choice to unilaterally  waive  such  reciprocity requirement  and  extend  its APEC
liberalisation  to all nonmembers.
APEC's  members  have so far been divided  over this last point.  While East Asian
countries  have  favoured  openness  towards  non-members,  the  us  President,  Bill
Clinton, made clear before APEC's  Bogor summit that any trade concessions would be
reciprocal,  and  that  there  would  be  'no  free-riders'.  One year  later  at the  Osaka
summit  Australia's  trade minister, Bob McMullan, stressed that they would also give
nothing  for nothing'.
Outside  Asia  other  countries  have also seen  the need  to reciprocally  open their
markets. The main argument  was highlighted by the Economist (29 June  1996) after
23Chile signed its FTA with  Mercosur: '[d]espite continued  protectionist pressure  from
their weaker  industries,  Mercosur's leaders all know  that, to attract investment  they
need  to  compete  in  the  wider  world,  their  firms  want  a  bigger  home  market'.
However, in the case of Mercosur unilateral liberalisation is not even on the agenda.
Instead its member countries are advancing towards a regional FTA  that will liberalise
trade  flows between members but not imports from outsiders. What can we say on
the basis of our analysis on the comparison  between 'open regionalism'  and a South-
South  FTA?
We have already discussed the trade-off. 'Open regionalism'  brings beneficial cost
linkages, but also more intense competition from outsiders. Comparison of figures  3
and  4  show  that  the  former  effect  is  most  important  in  the  early  stages  of
industrialisation,  and  the  latter  in  determining  real  income  once  industry  is
established.  Open regionalism brings earlier industrialisation  than South-South, but
at very low tariff levels South-South leads to more Southern  industry.  These results
are quite sensitive to parameter values. In particular, if Southern economies are small
Iopen regionalism'  works better for them  (a small country size reduces the effects of
trade  liberalisation,  but  weakens  market  access considerations  by  more).  This  is
because  with  a  small home  market  most of  their sales will take  place abroad,  so
protective tariffs are of little help to them, but extending liberalisation unilaterally to
non-members  lowers the  cost of intermediates  and  helps industrialisation  take off.
Given this,  it is not surprising  what  we  have observed  in Asia: smaller countries
pushing  for  unilateral  liberalisation  while  larger  ones  insist  on  reciprocal
concessions.  1 '2 1
4.4. Southern  disparities
In all the cases in which the two Southern economies follow symmetric policies we
have seen that the outcome is, for some interval of tariffs, asymmetric.  One country
industrialises  before the other, followed at a lower tariff rate by rapid  convergence
12  The fact that more small than large countries have liberalised unilaterally can also be explained
by smaller countries having less bargaining  power to extract reciprocal concessions. What is striking
is that  smaller Asian countries not only tend  to have more open  regimes, but  have also generally
expressed their preference for a more open approach to trade liberalisation even if larger countries in
APEC were not to do the same.
24which restores symmetry between the economies. This period of uneven development
occurs  because  of the  agglomeration  forces in the  model.  Forward  and  backward
linkages are strong enough that firms in the Southern countries choose to locate close
to each other, in a single country.
In the theoretical model the two Southern countries are assumed  to be identical, so
there  is no basis for deciding which country is the first to industrialise  -it  is simply
a matter of chance. In practice, differences between the two countries will decide the
issue  (possibly  quite  small  differences).  The  mix  of  factors  obviously  includes
institutional,  political,  and  geographical  considerations.  To  highlight  a  few,
geographical proximity to the existing industrial  centre will be beneficial, in so far as
closeness is associated with lower natural trade barriers. (This, we think, provides  an
interesting  way  of thinking  about  the  spread  of industry  from Japan  through  the
newly industrialising  economies). Low unit labour costs and  a larger  home market
will also pull in this direction  - unsurprisingly,  cheaper efficiency units of labour
and  a larger  home  market,  other  things  being  equal, increases  the  attraction  of a
country  as a base for industry.
These  differences  may  however  be  dominated  by  the  policy  regime  of  the
government,  and  this  creates  scope  for  policy  action  to  obtain  a  'first  mover
advantage'  and attract industry before it becomes established elsewhere. In the trade
policy context this creates the following incentives. First, LDCS  will have an incentive
to establish trade links with developed countries. As we have seen, North-South  FTAs
may be effective in attracting industry to South. More generally, links with developed
countries  may  give  a  particular  LDC the  margin  that  is  needed  to  ensure  that  it
becomes the first to industrialise in a South-South trading  arrangement.  The second
trade  policy  incentive  arises  in  a  multi-country  setting.  Countries  which  are  late
entrants to an FTA  will certainly not be the ones that first attract industry,  so there is
an incentive to be amongst  the founding  group.
In addition  to creating  incentives for countries to attract  industry,  the possibility
that industry  will agglomerate in a subset of member countries may also create real
tensions within  the PTA. The history of Southern  PTAS  is littered with  schemes  that
have failed, often because of internal  disputes over the location of industry  and the
design  of compensation  schemes for perceived losers in the arrangement  (a typical
25example is the Treaty of Brazzaville, which was intended  to create a customs union
and a common currency area with the former French Central African countries -see
Foroutan,  1993). One  message  from  this  paper  is  that  the  differences  between
countries may only be transitional -in  our figures the differences disappear  as tariffs
are reduced  low enough. However, there is no guarantee that the final liberalisation
will  necessarily  go  far  enough  to  iron  out  differences  and  secure  the  spread  of
industry  to all participating  Southern economies, particularly  if there are substantial
underlying  differences between these economies.
5. Conclusions
In  this paper  we have  outlined  a new approach  for analysing  the role of trade  in
promoting industrial  development. Interactions between imperfect competition, trade
costs, and  an  input-output  structure  create  incentives  for firms to  locate  close to
supplier  and customer firms. Clustering of firms then occurs, so that even if countries
are identical in underlying  structure,  only a few countries are industrialised.  These
countries have high wages, but the positive pecuniary externalities created by inter-
firm linkages compensate for the higher wage costs. Trade liberalisation changes the
attractiveness  of countries  as a base for manufacturing  production,  and  can trigger
-or  postpone-  industrial  development.
The process we describe abstract from many important  aspects of reality. We have
no  capital accumulation  (physical or human),  and no interregional  or international
differences in technology. Although we look at the consequences of changes in policy
variables  (in particular,  of  changes  in  the  barriers  to  trade),  there  is no  explicit
modelling  of the  political process  that leads  to a particular  choice of policy. Even
within  its  framework  the  model  we  employ  is  simple.  For  example,  firms  are
modelled as single plant operations, so multinationality and foreign direct investment
are  not  considered.  Also,  firms  are  footloose and  atomistic,  which  is  helpful  for
focusing on long-run outcomes but abstracts from the costs of relocation and strategic
interaction. Nevertheless, we think the approach captures a number of features of the
world economy which seem to be important, and provides some new insights on the
effects of trading  arrangements  on industrial  development.
26It offers an explanation  as to why firms are reluctant  to move to economies that
have lower wages and labour costs, and shows how trade  liberalisation can change
the incentives to become established in developing countries. It provides a mechanism
through  which  import  liberalisation  can  have  a  powerful  effect  in  promoting
industrialisation.  And  it suggests  that  import  liberalisation  may  create  or  amplify
differences between liberalising countries with the possible political tensions this may
create. While these features are consistent with the world economy, they of course fall
far short  of providing  convincing empirical support  for the approach.
Using the approach  we derive a number  of conclusions about the effects of trade
liberalisation.  The first is that unilaterally  liberalising imports  of manufactures  can
promote  development  of local manufacturing  industry.  The mechanism  is forward
linkages from imported  intermediates, but this may be interpreted  as part of a wider
package of linkages coming from these imports. Second, the gains from liberalisation
through  PTA  membership  are  likely  to  exceed  those  that  can  be  obtained  from
unilateral  action. South-South  PTAs  will be sensitive to the  market  size of member
states,  and  North-South  PTAs  seem  to  offer  better  prospects  -for  participating
Southern  economies,  if not for North  and  excluded  countries. Third,  the  effects of
particular  schemes  (on,  for  example,  the  division  of  benefits  between  Southern
economies)  will depend  on  the  characteristics of the  countries,  and  cross-country
differences  in  these  characteristics.  We  have  not  yet  conducted  systematic
investigation of the sensitivity of our results to such differences.
Appendix
We consider a world with 4 regions, two Northern  and two Southern, N1, N2, S 1 and
S 2. Each region  is endowed  with  L workers  and  K units  of arable  land,  and  can
produce  agricultural  and  industrial  output.  Both  primary  factors  are  immobile
between regions. Arable land is used only by the agricultural  sector, while labour is
used  both by agriculture  and by industry,  and is perfectly mobile between sectors.
27Agriculture
Agriculture  is perfectly competitive.  It produces  under  constant  returns  to  scale a
homogenous  output, which we assume costlessly tradeable and choose as num6rakre.
In  each region  the  agricultural  production  function  is Cobb-Douglas  in  land  and
labour,  with  labour  share  0. If  Le. denotes  agricultural  employment,  agricultural
output is (LA;)  0 Kj(le)  and the local wage is
wi = 0 (Lf)  (0-')  K 1I- 0).  (1)
Industry
The  industrial  sector  has  imperfectly  competitive  firms,  producing  differentiated
goods  under  increasing returns  to scale. Production  of a quantity xi(k) of any variety
k in any country  i requires  the same fixed (a) and variable  (Px 1(k)) quantities  of the
production  input. That production input is a Cobb-Douglas composite of labour and
a constant  elasticity of substitution  (CES)  aggregate  of the  differentiated  industrial
goods. The cost function of a firm producing  variety k in country  i is
C,(k) = qPPw,('P)(CC+px,(k)),  (2)
where  q, is the price index of the aggregate, defined by
q _S  f  (p* (h)  ( T.  iwc  )  dh  (3)
The price index in each country depends  on the local prices of individual  varieties,
which  in turn  are a function of the free on board  (FOB)  prices, real trade  costs, and
tariffs. The elasticity of substitution  between varieties, a  (> 1), is assumed  to be the
same in all countries. Nj is the set of varieties produced  in location j, and pj,(h) is the
FOB price of variety  h shipped  from country j  to country  i. Real trade  costs for the
industrial  goods  take Samuelson's  'iceberg' form: T units have to be shipped  so that
one  unit  arrives  in another  region. Industrial  goods  exported  from j  to  i are  also
subject to an ad valorem  tariff Tj, - 1.
28Preferences
Turning  to the  demand  side, consumers  have  Cobb-Douglas  preferences  over  the
agricultural  good  and  a CES aggregate  of industrial  goods. All industrial  varieties
produced  enter  consumers'  utility  function  with  the  same  constant  elasticity  of
substitution  with which they enter firms' technology. The indirect utility function of
a worker  in region i is then  given by
Vj = ql  -('-0)  W, . (4)
Landowners  have the  same preferences  as workers,  but  are assumed  to  be tied  to
their  land.
General equilibrium
Expenditure  on manufactures  in each region can be derived  from (2), (3) and  (4) as
=  Y [w1L, + (1 -O) (LJA)'  K 1( - ) + f  ti(h)dh  +  R,]  +  p  f C1(h)dh . (5)
her=N,  he N,
The first term is the value of consumer expenditure (including tariff revenue, denoted
by R,), and  the second  the value of intermediate  demand,  since consumers  spend  a
fraction y of their income and firms a fraction p of their costs on manufactures.
The division of consumers'  and producers'  expenditure on each industry  between
individual  varieties  of industrial  goods  can be found by differentiation of the price
index  with  respect  to  the  price  of the  variety.  Total demand  for a single  variety
produced  in i, xi, is
x1(k)  =  E  (p1J(k) TJ)  qj(`  4e.  (6)
Since the  producer  of an individual  good faces an elasticity  of demand  a,  firms
mark up  price over marginal cost by the factor a/ (a - 1):
29pi  =  CIOai w,  (I  (7)
The value of tariff revenue  is
4
R,=  E  (Tj, - 1) nj pj xj.  (8)
The profits of an individual  manufacturing  firm are, from expressions  (2) and  (7),
,=  ( X- x)  (9)
where
a  (X  -1)  (10)
is the unique level of output  giving firms zero profits.
Turning  to the labour market, we can write the labour market  clearing condition
as
L, =  (1  - LpAn  (11)
where n, - #N, denotes the mass of firms in region i (to which we refer as the number
of firms in region 1).  The first term on the right hand side of (12) is labour demand
in manufacturing,  obtained by application of Shephard's  lemma to (2),  and the second
term  is labour  demand  in agriculture.
This  completes  the  description  of  equilibrium.  At  any  instant  we think  of the
economy  as having  a predetermined  number  of firms in each region. To this  pair
corresponds  a short-run  equilibrium  defined  as a  set of wages,  and  price  indices
solution to the following eight equations. The first four equations are the price indices
of manufactures  in each of the four regions, obtained  by substitution  of (7) into (3).
The other four equations come from substituting  (1), (2), and (5)-(10) into (11),  which
gives the labour market clearing condition in each region. We can then express profits
30at the short-run  equilibrium in terms of the number of firms by substituting  equations
(1)-(2), (5)-(8), and  (10), and  the  short-run  equilibrium  values  of wages  and  price
indices into (9).
We define a long-run equilibrium as a situation in which the numbers of firms are
such  that there are zero profits in each country where  there is a positive number  of
firms and negative profits (for potential, if not for actual, firms) wherever the number
of firms is zero:
iin,n  = °  ,i  < O ,  n, 2 0,  (12)
The experiments
At  the  starting  point  in  all  our  experiments  there  are  real  trade  costs  of T =  1.1
between all four regions, there is an ad valorem tariff of 15% (T = 1.15)  for all North-
South  and  South-South  trade,  while there  is free trade  between  the two  Northern
economies (T = 1), which keep a common trade  policy throughout  the experiments.
Values of parameters  are y = 0.5, 0 = 0.8, p = 0.55, and a  = 4. These are such that at
the initial level of tariff barriers there is a stable equilibrium  in which all industry  is
split between the two Northern  economies. The experiments look at the evolution  of
this  equilibrium  as some  (or, in  the case of multilateral  liberalisation,  all) of these
tariffs are brought down  to zero (T = 1), with  those not affected by the liberalisation
held at T.
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